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Moving ahead now on all these 
fronts is also important in order 
to align every stakeholder’s inter-
est with value, or reform will 
once again fail. However, a health 
care strategy, like any good strat-
egy, involves a sequence of steps 
over time rather than an attempt 
to change everything at once. Road 
maps will be needed for rolling 
out changes in each area while 
giving the actors time to adjust.
Some new organizations (or 
combinations of existing ones) 
will be needed: a new independent 
body to oversee outcome measure-
ment and reporting, a single en-
tity to review and set HIT stan-
dards, and possibly a third body 
to establish rules for bundled re-
imbursement. Medicare may be 
able to take the lead in some 
areas; for example, Medicare could 
require experience reporting by 
providers or combine Parts A and 
B into one payment.
The big question is whether 
we can move beyond a reactive 
and piecemeal approach to a true 
national health care strategy cen-
tered on value. This undertaking 
is complex, but the only real so-
lution is to align everyone in the 
system around a common goal: 
doing what’s right for patients.
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A Strategy for Health Care Reform — Toward a Value-Based System
Managing and Reducing Uncertainty in an Emerging  
Influenza Pandemic
Marc Lipsitch, D.Phil., Steven Riley, D.Phil., Simon Cauchemez, Ph.D., Azra C. Ghani, Ph.D.,  
and Neil M. Ferguson, D.Phil.
The early phases of an epi-demic present decision mak-
ers with predictable challenges1 
that have been evident as the 
current novel influenza A (H1N1) 
virus has spread. The scale of the 
problem is uncertain when a 
disease first appears but may in-
crease rapidly. Early action is re-
quired, but decisions about ac-
tion must be made when the 
threat is only modest — and 
consequently, they involve a 
trade-off between the compara-
tively small, but nearly certain, 
harm that an intervention may 
cause (such as rare adverse 
events from large-scale vaccina-
tion or economic and social costs 
from school dismissals) and the 
uncertain probability of much 
greater harm from a widespread 
outbreak. This combination of 
urgency, uncertainty, and the 
costs of interventions makes the 
effort to control infectious dis-
eases especially difficult.
Plans for addressing influenza 
pandemics define a graded series 
of responses to emerging pan-
demic viruses, ranging from very 
limited interventions to stringent 
measures such as closing schools 
and other public venues, encour-
aging people to work at home, 
and using antiviral drugs for 
treatment and prophylaxis. Such 
grading of responses is based on 
the pandemic’s severity; for ex-
ample, the United States’ Pan-
demic Severity Index is calibrated 
to the case fatality ratio (www.
pandemicflu.gov/plan/community/ 
community_mitigation.pdf). Mild 
responses are prescribed for a 
strain resembling seasonal influ-
enza, which kills perhaps 0.1% of 
those infected, with higher rates 
in the very young and elderly, 
whereas stringent measures are 
envisioned for a very severe pan-
demic with a case fatality ratio of 
2% or more and deaths concen-
trated in the middle age groups.
This approach makes sense in 
theory, but in practice, decisions 
have had to be made before defini-
tive information was available on 
the severity, transmissibility, or 
natural history of the new H1N1 
virus. The United States, for ex-
ample, passed the 1000-case mark 
on May 4, and the second death 
was reported on May 5. Crudely 
speaking, the case fatality ratio 
thus appeared to be 0.2%, near the 
upper end of the range for season-
al influenza, and superficially, this 
statistically uncertain estimate 
seems remarkably accurate given 
the data available on May 27, by 
which point there were 11 deaths 
and 7927 confirmed cases (a case 
fatality ratio of 0.14%).
However, two principal sourc-
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es of uncertainty critically affect 
severity estimates. The proportion 
of severe cases is overestimated 
in settings where many mild 
cases are not reported or tested, 
a situation that is becoming more 
common as public health officials 
become unable to test a large 
fraction of suspected cases. In 
contrast, severity estimates are 
biased downward when they are 
calculated as simple ratios of 
numbers of deaths to numbers 
of cases, because there is a delay 
between the onset of illness and 
death. During the 1918 influenza 
pandemic, the mean time from 
symptom onset to death was 8 to 
9 days,2 whereas the number of 
cases was doubling about every 
3 days. With a similar delay, to-
day’s deaths would reflect the 
state of the epidemic three dou-
blings ago, when there were 
about one eighth the number of 
cases there are now. If modern 
therapies have extended the time 
between onset and death, the 
censoring bias will be even more 
pronounced. Such uncertainty has 
made it impossible to assess se-
verity confidently.
Moreover, several other factors 
suggest that it is premature to 
dismiss concerns about severity. 
First, this virus tends to infect 
relatively young, healthy people, 
and it caused a high hospitaliza-
tion rate of 2% in the United 
States even before testing shift-
ed to emphasize severe cases.3 
Second, the much higher pro-
portion of people likely to be in-
fected in a pandemic (because of 
limited immunity to the new 
strain) will mean substantially 
higher levels of severe outcomes 
than usual. A virus that is fatal 
in “only” 0.15% of cases but in-
fects twice the typical number 
of people would cause about three 
times as many deaths as typical 
influenza, or more than 100,000 
deaths in the United States. More-
over, this “mild” illness will al-
most certainly take a more severe 
toll in less wealthy countries, as 
infectious diseases routinely do. 
The Northern Hemisphere may 
see a decline in transmission over 
the summer, but the 1918 pan-
demic demonstrated that sus-
tained spring and summer trans-
mission is possible for a novel 
influenza strain, and the South-
ern Hemisphere is entering its 
influenza season now. The South-
ern Hemisphere, at least, and pos-
sibly the entire world, is likely to 
see a substantial epidemic of this 
virus in the next few months, 
with attack rates exceeding those 
in a typical influenza season, be-
fore significant quantities of vac-
cine become available.
Paradoxically, uncertainty about 
this infection’s characteristics is 
likely to increase further as the 
Northern Hemisphere’s summer 
progresses. The low specificity of 
clinical signs and symptoms, com-
bined with changes in reporting 
practices, will make it difficult 
to interpret apparent incidence 
trends at the national level. With-
out reliable incidence measures, 
it is impossible to track the epi-
demic’s growth rate, which makes 
estimates of transmissibility high-
ly uncertain and subject to bias-
es because of changes in the 
probability of detection. School 
absences, a crude measure of 
epidemic spread, will become less 
informative once most schools 
are closed for the summer. With-
out good incidence estimates, 
estimates of severity will con-
tinue to suffer from an uncer-
tain denominator. The effective-
ness of control measures will be 
difficult to assess without accu-
rate measures of local incidence. 
When a vaccine becomes available, 
appropriate targeting of limited 
supplies will require knowledge of 
levels of preexisting immunity, 
age-specific severity estimates, 
and other quantities that depend 
on reliable measures of the inci-
dence of mild and severe disease.
If we could be sure that the 
infection would remain mild in 
most cases, these uncertainties 
would be similar to those we tol-
erate in a normal influenza sea-
son, although the numbers af-
fected would probably be larger. 
But historically, pandemic viruses 
have evolved between seasons,4,5 
and the current strain may be-
come more severe or transmissi-
ble in the coming months. Thus, 
decision makers in both hemi-
spheres could again face uncer-
tainty about the characteristics 
of a possibly evolving virus in the 
coming half-year.
There is a brief window of 
opportunity to take measures to 
reduce the uncertainty. Serologic 
studies in the tropics during the 
Northern Hemisphere summer 
and at higher latitudes in both 
hemispheres will permit estima-
tion of the extent of spread of 
mild infection. If transmission 
wanes in the north, a late-sum-
mer serologic survey will provide 
baseline information about pop-
ulation immunity that will aid in 
both vaccine targeting and inter-
pretation of patterns of illness 
in the fall.
Serologic surveys represent 
snapshots of the population rath-
er than real-time measures of in-
cidence. Additional surveillance is 
needed to quantify the incidence 
of mild and severe infection in 
nearly real time. Surveillance for 
nonspecific indicators, such as 
visits to health care providers for 
influenza-like illness or hospital-
ization for pneumonia, can pro-
vide an indication of the total 
disease burden but cannot deter-
mine causation. Such surveillance 
should be combined with routine 
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testing of a systematic sample of 
patients to estimate the total bur-
den of H1N1-attributable disease. 
In combination with serologic 
surveys, such surveillance would 
allow public health officials to es-
timate the proportions of infec-
tions leading to mild and severe 
illness and to determine how they 
vary with age and other risk fac-
tors. Detailed outbreak investiga-
tions in households and schools 
would elucidate transmission dy-
namics and inform recommenda-
tions on containment measures. 
Although cases detected by rou-
tine surveillance are subject to 
case-ascertainment bias, second-
ary cases in a household or a 
school outbreak constitute an un-
biased sample that can be used 
to estimate illness severity. House-
hold-transmission studies also 
provide information on age-spe-
cific susceptibility profiles while 
controlling for levels of exposure.
Augmenting traditional surveil-
lance systems to measure the new 
virus’s spread should be a high 
priority. Since the measures out-
lined above are expensive and re-
quire substantial infrastructure, 
they are practical for only a limit-
ed number of sentinel sites. To ex-
tend the range of surveillance, 
nontraditional approaches may be 
important. Web-based incidence 
surveys may be practical if there 
are adequate incentives to respond 
and adequate privacy assurances. 
Daily school absences should be 
tracked according to grade and 
school and made available for 
real-time analysis. Use of mobile 
phones for repeated surveys of 
large population samples may be 
another method for real-time sur-
veillance in areas where more tra-
ditional approaches are impossible 
or too expensive. Though such ap-
proaches cannot discern the cause 
of illness, they compensate with 
greater coverage and speed of data 
availability. The value of these ap-
proaches will be greatest if they 
are also conducted in areas where 
more traditional surveillance is 
also under way, so that their rela-
tionship to validated measures of 
virologically confirmed incidence 
can be calibrated.
International cooperation will 
be crucial, not only to enhance 
capacity for surveillance in the 
tropics and the Southern Hemi-
sphere but also to monitor chang-
es in antigenicity, severity, trans-
missibility, and antiviral resistance 
that may be reflected in a fall wave 
in the Northern Hemisphere. Many 
approaches suggested here to im-
prove awareness of the epidemic 
during the Northern Hemisphere’s 
fall can be applied more immedi-
ately in the tropics and the South-
ern Hemisphere during the up-
coming influenza seasons there.
Surveillance systems and our 
understanding of the dynamics 
of infectious-disease transmission 
have improved substantially since 
the 1968 influenza pandemic. 
These improvements can be used 
to support policymakers in man-
aging the current pandemic. If 
new data-collection systems capa-
ble of reducing key uncertainties 
are to be implemented in time 
for the autumn, international and 
intersector cooperation leverag-
ing the expertise of the univer-
sity and private sectors must be 
combined with rapid enhancement 
of traditional, government-spon-
sored surveillance.
Public communication of risk 
and uncertainty will be critical. 
It has been suggested that the 
existing criteria for moving to 
World Health Organization pan-
demic phase 6 (sustained trans-
mission in multiple geographic 
regions) should be modified to 
incorporate a judgment that the 
world’s population is at increased 
risk. We would argue against con-
flating assessments of transmis-
sibility and severity in this sub-
jective way, which risks adding 
to the confusion faced by decision 
makers and the public. Rather, 
the global extent of a pandemic 
should be described objectively 
and should be just one factor in 
decisions about how to respond.
As we adjust our mitigation 
policies, there will be a continu-
ing need to make decisions with-
out definitive estimates of sever-
ity. For example, the decision to 
move from production of vaccine 
for seasonal influenza to that for 
pandemic influenza will need to 
be made in the next month or 
two. Similarly, the United States 
will need to decide soon whether 
to use adjuvanted vaccines to pro-
tect more people with a given 
amount of antigen, although such 
vaccines are not currently licensed 
in the United States. As always, 
however, the main losers from 
delays in such decisions are likely 
to be developing countries, which 
will have less access to vaccine 
while probably suffering the great-
est clinical impact from this new 
pandemic virus.
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Geographic Dependence, Surveillance, and Origins of the 2009 
Influenza A (H1N1) Virus
Vladimir Trifonov, Ph.D., Hossein Khiabanian, Ph.D., and Raul Rabadan, Ph.D.
In April 2009, a new strain of human H1N1 influenza A vi- rus was identified in Mexico. According to the World Health Organization (www.who.int/csr/don/2009_05_25), as of May 25, 
2009, the virus had spread to 43 
countries, with 12,515 reported 
cases and 91 associated deaths, 
and it has been assessed as hav-
ing pandemic potential.1
Genomic analysis of the 2009 
influenza A (H1N1) virus in hu-
mans indicates that it is closely 
related to common reassortant 
swine influenza A viruses isolat-
ed in North America, Europe, 
and Asia (Fig. 1).2-4 The segments 
coding for the polymerase com-
plex, hemagglutinin, nuclear pro-
tein, and nonstructural proteins 
show high similarity with the 
swine H1N2 influenza A viruses 
isolated in North America in the 
late 1990s (Table 1). H1N2 and 
other subtypes are descendants 
of the triple-reassortant swine 
H3N2 viruses isolated in North 
America. They have spread in 
swine hosts around the globe 
and have been found to infect 
humans.5 The segments coding 
for the neuraminidase and the 
matrix proteins of the new hu-
man H1N1 virus are, however, 
distantly related to swine viruses 
isolated in Europe in the early 
1990s (Table 2). In particular, 
the closest isolated relatives of 
the neuraminidase segment have 
94.4% similarity at the nucleotide 
level with European swine influ-
enza A virus strains from 1992.
In the past few years, there 
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Figure 1. History of Reassortment Events in the Evolution of the 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) Virus.
The eight segments shown within each virus code for the following proteins of the influenza A virus 
(top to bottom): polymerase PB2, polymerase PB1, polymerase PA, hemagglutinin, nuclear pro-
tein, neuraminidase, matrix proteins, and nonstructural proteins. The segments of the human 
2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus have coexisted in swine influenza A virus strains for more than 10 
years. The ancestors of neuraminidase have not been observed for almost 20 years. The mixing 
vessel for the current reassortment is likely to be a swine host but remains unknown.
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